The Italian army comprised four brigades totalling 17,700 troops, with fifty-six artillery pieces. [6] However, it is likely that even fewer men fought in this battle on the Italian side: Harold Marcus notes that "several thousand" soldiers were needed for support and to guard the lines of communication to the rear, so he estimates the Italian army to have consisted of 14,500 effectives. [7] One brigade under General Albertone was made up of Eritrean askari led by Italian officers. The remaining three brigades were Italian units under Brigadiers Dabormida, Ellena and Arimondi. While these included elite Bersaglieri, Alpini and Cacciatori units, a large proportion of the troops were inexperienced conscripts recently drafted from metropolitan regiments in Italy into newly formed "di formazione" battalions for service in Africa [8] [9] .
As Chris Prouty describes:
They [the Italians] had inadequate maps, old model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. (The newer Remingtons were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges.) Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers, too inexperienced to have any esprit de corps. There was a shortage of mules and saddles. [10]
But the Ethiopian army had its own problems. The first was the quality of its arms, as the Italian and British colonial authorities could sabotage the transportation of 30,000-60,000 modern Berdan rifles from Russia into landlocked Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army was also based on a feudal system of organization; as a result, nearly the entire army was comprised of peasant militia. Russian military experts advising Menelik II suggested avoiding full engagement with Italians, instead engaging in a campaign of harassment to nullify problems with arms, training, and organization. In the battle that ensued wave upon wave of Menelik's warriors attacked the Italians.
As Chris Prouty describes:
They [the Italians] had inadequate maps, old model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. (The newer Remingtons were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges.) Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers, too inexperienced to have any esprit de corps. There was a shortage of mules and saddles. [10]
But the Ethiopian army had its own problems. The first was the quality of its arms, as the Italian and British colonial authorities could sabotage the transportation of 30,000-60,000 modern Berdan rifles from Russia into landlocked Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army was also based on a feudal system of organization; as a result, nearly the entire army was comprised of peasant militia. Russian military experts advising Menelik II suggested avoiding full engagement with Italians, instead engaging in a campaign of harassment to nullify problems with arms, training, and organization. In the battle that ensued wave upon wave of Menelik's warriors attacked the Italians.
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